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SALT LAKE CITY, A 
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County, the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, judge, presiding. 
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STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER, #5838 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801 )-535-7767 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: CASE NO. 92-0086-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1.Whether the trial court finding of no pretext stop was "clearly 
erroneous"? 
2.Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial 
court's ruling that Officer Wasden was justified in stopping the 
subject vehicle. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering an appeal of a motion to suppress, the Court of 
Appeals should give deference to the trial court's findings of 
fact, and be governed by a "clearly erroneous" standard. State 
v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. 
Questions of law which flow from these factual findings are 
to reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State v. Lopez, 181 
Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 42; State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City concurs in appellant's Statement of the Case 
except that the charge was based on a violation of Section 
12.24.100 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Wasden was, as stated by appellant, the only 
witness who gave testimony at the initial jury setting, however, 
in referring to the transcript (hereinafter "T") prepared and 
attached to appellant's brief as Appendix 2, it is clear that his 
testimony regarding traffic violations was limited to the 300 
South intersection and apparent traffic violations. (T. 11) 
Officer Wasden testified that he observed the suspect vehicle 
weaving back and forth, (T. 12) stating "I suspected that he may 
have been drinking based on the driving pattern I'd seen". (T. 
13) 
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The trial court found specifically, based on the testimony 
of Officer Wasden; 
[T]he conditions existing in the way he drove down 
the street, I think provided probable cause. The 
officer's training and background indicated there 
might be a problem with alcohol. I think itfs 
soundly based on experience and view, and your 
motion (to dismiss) is denied, sir. 
(T. 14). 
It is clear from the testimony given by Officer Wasden, 
that he stopped the suspect vehicle based on his articulated 
suspicion that the driver was under the influence of alcohol. (T. 
13) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court, having heard the evidence, ruled properly 
in finding that Officer Wasden did not stop the appellant under a 
pretext to search in an unconstitutional manner. 
The trial court was correct in finding that Officer 
Wasdenfs stop of the suspect vehicle on the basis of a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver was committing a traffic 
offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, was 
proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE CAN BE NO ISSUE OF A PRETEXTUAL STOP WHERE THE 
VIOLATION CHARGED IS THE BASIS FOR THE STOP. 
Appellee concurs with the appellantf s statement of the 
appropriate standard of review. The "clearly erroneous" standard 
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requires the ruling to be reversed if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence or it is apparent that a mistake has been 
made. It does not mean that the appellate court considers and 
weighs the evidence de novo or that a ruling may be reversed 
merely because the reviewing court may have reached a different 
result. Great weight is still accorded the trial court and its 
decision is reversed only if there is inadequate evidentiary 
support or a mistake in the law. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987). 
As recently as March of this year, this Court has addressed 
the issue of pretext stops, stating that; 
the pretext doctrine applies in cases where the officer 
claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic 
violation, but where the court determines the stop was not 
made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an 
unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has 
deviated from the normal course of action expected of a 
reasonable officer. State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 
42, citing State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978. 
This court articulated the pretext doctrine further as; 
whether a "reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality 
of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have 
stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. Id. 
The trial court held in this case, that there was no 
pretext stop, because the officer acted as any reasonable 
officer with similar training and experience would have when 
faced with the same circumstances. This case goes one step 
further, however, because the officer in this case had no 
unconstitutional motivation, he was completely forthright about 
his reason for pulling the vehicle over. 
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The finding of facts by the trial court is clearly 
supported by sufficient evidence to sustain the denial of 
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of pretext stop. 
II. REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
IN PROGRESS IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A STOP, 
There are numerous reasons an officer might have for 
pulling a vehicle over, this court, again in Lopez, identified 
three situations where the officer is justified in stopping a 
vehicle: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic 
violation; (2) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a 
traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of 
alcohol... ; and (3) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in more 
serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs, 
(citations omitted)(emphasis added) 
The issue presented by the immediate case pertains to the 
second situation, and although presented inappropriately to the 
trial court as a question of a pretextual stop, it was addressed 
properly by the trial court in it's response as a question of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See generally, State v. 
Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court, after 
having heard the evidence, ruled that "The conditions existing 
... provided probable cause. The officer's training and 
background indicated there might be a problem with alcohol." (T. 
14) The trial court having stated specifically the basis for 
its finding that probable cause existed, this Court should 
review it under the "clearly erroneous" standard. The evidence 
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in support of the reasonable articulable suspicion or probable 
cause is sufficient to sustain the ruling of the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the City requests that the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on the 
basis of pretext stop be affirmed• 
Respectfully submitted this day of M~L. , 1991. 
'EPHEN P. ZOLLINGER STEPH !
Assistant City Prosecutor 
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